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This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of the 
leverage ratios (the  book value of liabilities divided by the total of the 
book value of liabilities'  and the market value of equity) for 232 bank holding 
companies for December 1986, June 1987, and December 1987. Many theoretical 
models of bank behavior assume that bank capital requirements will be binding, 
and empirical research has generally shown that almost all-  banks will meet 
capital guidelines. However, if the optimal leverage ratios differ among 
banks, then banks' responses to changes in capital requirements or to changes 
in factors that influence their optimal leverage ratio may vary in a cross 
section. The theoretical framework is a variant of the one developed in 
Bradley, Jarrell  , and Kim (1984)  . The optimal'  leverage ratio balances the tax 
advantage of debt with the costs of bankruptcy. In  addition to considering 
nondebt tax shields and tax rates as determinants of the optimal ratio, we 
analyze the simultaneity between leverage and investment in municipal 
securities (munis).  Previous research indicates that banks utilize munis to' 
minimize tax liabilities. 
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The impact of bank capital regulation has reemerged as a topic of debate 
since the establishment of risk-based  capital guidelines.  Capital 
requirements are intended both to control excessive risk-taking  and to limit 
the exposure of the deposit-insurance  fund.  Capital regulation may be 
rationalized as a necessary part of a system of bank regulation that involves 
fixed-rate  deposit insurance.  However, it is unclear whether capital 
guidelines have been successful in meeting their objectives.  Even if most 
banks meet or exceed the guidelines, at least in a book-value sense, 
guidelines may affect market leverage and have a perverse impact on 
risk-taking.  For example, banks may resort to accounting gimmicks to meet the 
guidelines,  or they may redefine products or activities to circumvent them. 
In addition, a focus on market-value  measures of capital adequacy, or on the 
extent to which banks maintain capital cushions,  may be more appropriate for 
assessing the exposure of the deposit-insurance  fund.  Although all of these 
factors may be examined by regulators,  their links with capital regulation are 
unclear. 
On the surface, capital guidelines would seem to be effective, since 
the vast majority of banks increase their (book-value)  capital ratios in 
order to meet the requirements.  However, this need not imply that the 
guidelines are effective, because market influences may affect the capital 
decision.  For example, in a system of partial deposit insurance, it is 
difficult to separate regulatory influences from market influences  , since 
the interests of the insurer and the uninsured depositors are similar.  Then, 
if regulators and depositors react to similar information, an increase in 
capital requirements followed by an actual increase in capital ratios does not 
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market-equity  values incorporate a deposit-insurance  subsidy that varies 
inversely with the capital-asset  ratio, then an increase in capital will have 
a smaller impact on the market-value measure of capital adequacy than on the 
narrower book measure.  Furthermore,  market-equity  values include the value of 
growth options that are not captured by book-equity measures. 
In the absence of regulation, the optimal leverage ratio for a bank may 
be below, above, or equal to the guidelines.  To some extent, optimal leverage 
ratios for banks may be determined as for nonfinancial corporations, that is, 
by a tax advantage for debt interacting with expected bankruptcy and agency 
costs.  Thus, tax rates, nondebt tax shields, and proxies for debt-related 
costs (such as variance of cash flow) may affect capital ratios.  There may be 
influences unique to banks as well, such as economies of scale in the 
provision of deposit services.  In addition, agency problems are introduced by 
capital regulation and deposit insurance.  The possibility of a 
deposit-insurance subsidy and the existence of government guarantees may also 
encourage lower capital ratios.  Some theoretical analyses of bank behavior 
assume that capital guidelines will always be binding.  However, even if in 
practice the incentives to increase leverage are great enough relative to the 
costs that banks are at the capital guidelines, market influences may affect 
the response of leverage to changes in regulations. In other words, capital 
positions may  influence bank portfolio decisions. 
In this paper, we analyze the impact of capital regulation  by 
considering a model of a bank that responds to both market and regulatory 
forces in its choice of optimal market leverage ratio (the book value of 
liabilities divided by the total of the book value of liabilities and the 
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Jarrell, and Kim (1984). 
In  the absence of capital regulation, the optimal leverage ratio 
balances the tax advantages of debt against the expected costs of debt. 
Variations in nondebt tax shields, tax rates, and the variance of bank return 
affect the optimal leverage ratio in the simple model.  In the presence of 
capital requirements, the expected cost of violating the guidelines is part of 
the expected cost of leverage.  Our model allows for the possibility of 
deposit-insurance  subsidies or other government guarantees, which may be 
reflected in  market leverage ratios.  Although portfolio composition is taken 
as a given, riskiness is allowed to influence the bank's  leverage decision. 
The model implies that the market leverage ratio will vary with tax rates, tax 
shields,  variance of return, and municipal bond holdings (munis).  It is 
important to note that the response of leverage to market influences will also 
vary with capital position.  Munis are included in the analysis because they 
are closely related to bank tax liability. 
We utilize balance-sheet data on 232 bank holding companies from 
December 1986 to December 1987, and estimate a two-equation  simultaneous 
system  between leverage and munis using an instrumental  variables technique. 
The capital ratio relative to the overall average is a determinant of the 
response of leverage to changes in tax rates,  nondebt tax shields, and 
loan-loss  provisions.  The variance of bank returns is also assumed to 
influence the response of leverage.  A variety of balance-sheet  proxies for 
the variance are considered, following the suggestions of Kuester and O'Brien 
(1989).  Results provide some support for considering taxes, capital 
regulation, munis, and risk in analyzing bank leverage decisions. 
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A. Optimal Financial Structure for Financial Institutions:  Theory 
The theory of optimal financial structure for nonfinancial institutions 
may not be directly applicable to financial intermediaries such as banks.  For 
nonfinancial corporations, there is a consensus that optimal structure 
balances the tax advantage to debt against leverage-related  costs.  The 
ability of corporations such as banks to deduct interest on debt encourages 
leverage and makes relevant nondebt tax shields such as depreciation, tax 
credits, and munis.  Leverage-related costs arise due to the possibility of 
bankruptcy and agency problems associated with conflicts among creditors, 
stockholders, and managers.  In  the case of banks, problems include conflicts 
involving the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and other 
regulators. 
The theory of optimal financial structures for financial intermediaries 
differs from the theory for nonfinancial firms for at least three reasons. 
First, incomplete markets seem to be necessary to explain the existence of 
intermediaries.  Second, the role of deposits seems to make the separation of 
operating and financial decisions unlikely.  Third, the role of regulatory 
forces is harder to ignore. 
A wide body of research  has attempted to analyze the role of 
informational asymmetries and the resulting contracts in order to explain the 
existence of intermediaries (see Boyd and Prescott [I9861 and Diamond [1984]). 
The "finance" approach is somewhat distinct.  Hart and Jaffee (1974) made an 
early attempt to apply finance theory to intermediaries. Sealey (1983, 1985) 
discusses conditions under which shareholder unanimity obtains given a 
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unanimity and separation of operating and financial decisions.  Chen, Doherty, 
and Park (1988) utilize an option pricing framework to analyze the 
capital-structure  decisions of depository financial intermediaries in the 
presence of deposit insurance, reserve requirements, liquidity effects, and 
taxation.  They conclude that no clear separation  between operating and 
financial decisions exists, and that this even applies to analysis of the 
impact of taxation on leverage decisions. 
As discussed in Santomero's  (1984) survey of approaches to modeling bank 
behavior, most analyses of bank-capital structure assume that the leverage 
choice is made conditional on asset choices.  Orgler and Taggart (1983) 
provide one such approach, showing that economies of scale in the provision of 
deposit services can help to determine intermediaries' optimal choice of 
leverage.  If 100 percent of all bank debt can be viewed as insured, then the 
option pricing framework can be utilized to examine capital-structure issues. 
In fact, the conclusions of theoretical analyses of the impact of bank capital 
requirements are closely tied to the treatment of deposit insurance and 
government guarantees.  This may not be surprising, given the findings 
of Buser, Chen, and Kane (1981), who view capital regulation  as imposing an 
implicit risk-related  insurance premium that discourages  banks from exploiting 
a subsidy implied by  flat-rate  deposit insurance. 
Koehn and Santomero (1980) analyze the impact of increased capital 
requirements on the portfolio choices of  banks that are risk-averse  expected 
utility maximizers and conclude that portfolio reshuffling would unambiguously 
increase the probability of  bankruptcy.  Lam and Chen (1985) and Kim and 
Santomero (1988) are examples of similar approaches.  Keeley and Furlong 
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(1987) point out that these approaches ignore the impact of changes in 
leverage and portfolio risk on the deposit-insurance  subsidy, clarifying 
these effects within a value-maximization framework.  Osterberg and Thomson 
(1988) show that the impact of capital requirements is closely related to the 
extent to which deposit insurance is mispriced.  The option pricing framework 
has also been utilized by Pyle (1986) and Marcus (1984) to show how the impact 
of capital requirements depends on closure policy and other aspects of 
regulation. 
B  . Optimal Financial Structure for Financial Institutions  : Evidence 
Distinguishing market forces from regulatory forces is a major 
difficulty in discerning the effectiveness of capital guidelines.  Peltzman 
(1970) finds that the guidelines have no effect on  bank capital, while Mingo 
(1975) reaches the opposite conclusion.  Dietrich and James (1983) point out 
that, under interest-rate  ceilings,  banks can influence risk-adjusted returns 
on debt by augmenting capital.  In that case, under partial deposit insurance, 
both regulators and uninsured depositors benefit from higher capital, so it is 
crucial to develop distinct measures of regulatory and market influences. 
Dietrich and James conclude that the guidelines have no distinct influence. 
Marcus (1983), Wall and Peterson (1987),  and Keeley (1988a, 1988b) look 
at bank holding companies rather than at independent banks.  Wall and Peterson 
consider the reaction of equity values to distinguish between two regimes, one 
in which capital ratios are higher than the requirements and thus are 
influenced by market forces, and another in which the ratios are at their 
regulatory minimum.  Their evidence suggests that most banks are influenced by 
regulation. 
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regulatory pressure to increase capital by  the holding company's  capital ratio 
relative to the average, in terms of book or market value.  He finds that the 
incentive to decrease capital varies positively with the level and variability 
of interest rates, as well as with the tax disadvantage of equity finance. 
Regulation seems to have no effect; however, his regulatory measure does not 
incorporate risk. 
Keeley (1988a) looks at the response of bank holding companies to the 
increased capital requirements of the 1980s.  Although capital-deficient  banks 
increased their ratios more than did capital-sufficient  banks in order to meet. 
the guidelines in a book-value sense, market ratios increased for both classes 
of banks.  However, the possibility of regulatory subsidies or taxes can 
influence the response of market-value capital ratios to increased capital 
guidelines, since the value of the subsidy to the bank can  vary with leverage 
or asset risk.  Keeley (1988b) claims that increased competition erodes the 
value of bank charters and thereby raises the incentives to increase leverage 
or to reduce capital ratios.  Charter values should be reflected in market 
capital ratios, but not necessarily in book ratios. 
The relevance of taxes to the capital structure of banks is discussed in 
more detail by Wall and Peterson (1988) and Gelfand and Hanweck (1987).  Wall 
and Peterson focus on large banks affiliated with bank holding companies. 
They argue that tax considerations are not important in analyzing the capital 
structure of banks affiliated with holding companies, since the tax 
consequences of the parent issuing debt to buy subsidiary equity are similar 
to those ensuing when the bank itself issues debt.  Gelfand and Hanweck 
examine financial data for 11,000  banks and find strong evidence for market 
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significantly influence leverage.  Gelfand and Hanweck use munis as their 
proxy for nondebt tax shields. 
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA),  banks had an advantage in the 
purchase of munis.  Before August 7, 1986, they could deduct a portion of the 
interest expense associated with the purchase of these securities.  In studies 
using a pre-TRA sample period, muni holdings seem to be related to taxable 
income,  tax shields, and relative yields.  Osterberg (1990) provides recent 
evidence regarding the determinants of bankst  holdings of munis. 
111. The Model 
In this section, we set up a single-period  model of optimal capital 
structure for a regulated banking firm that is an extension of the Bradley, 
Jarrell, and Kim (BJK [1984])  mob1  of optimal capital structure for the 
nonregulated firm.  We thus allow for both market and regulatory forces to 
influence bank leverage.  Risk, in terms of the variance of returns, is 
assumed given, although it can influence the leverage decision.  We also 
cannot control for the influence of regulatory subsidies, such as may be 
implied  by fixed-rate  &posit  insurance.  As  in BJK, we assume that 
1.  Investors are risk-neutral. 
2.  The personal tax rate on returns from bank debt is t*. 
3.  The personal tax rate on equity and the marginal corporate tax rate are 
constant and tp,  and t,,  respectively. 
4.  All taxes are based on end-of-period  wealth. 
5.  The firm's  end-of-period  tax liability can be reduced through nondebt 
tax shields, 4, which include investment tax credits and accelerated 
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holding municipal debt. 
6.  Unused tax credits cannot be transferred across time or firms. 
7.  Positive costs associated with financial distress are incurred if banks 
cannot meet their end-of  -period  promised payments to depositors, ?. 
8.  The end-of-period  value of the bank before taxes and debt payments is 
z. If  is less than ?,  then the the costs of financial distress reduce 
bank equity value by a factor of k. 
In addition,  we make the following assumptions: 
9.  Banks face an end-of-period  capital requirement of 6 - ?d. 
10.  In  states of the world where z-9  is less than 6, a regulatory 
penalty reduces the return to stockholders  by a constant fraction, A. 
11.  All bank liabilities are uninsured deposits that mature at the end 
of the period. 
12.  The capital constraint, 6,  is binding at end-of-period  values of k 
where the tax shields,  d, are being fully utilized by  the bank. 
The reader is referred to BJK for a discussion of assumptions 1 through 
8. Assumptions 9 and 10 are made to incorporate the effects of a regulatory 
capital requirement on the capital-structure  decision of a bank.  As  in Buser 
et al. (1981), bank regulators use their regulatory powers to levy a tax or 
penalty on banks that fail to meet minimum capital requirements.  Assumption 
11  allows us to isolate the effects of capital requirements on optimal capital 
structure independent of the effects of deposit insurance.  Thomson (1987) 
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insurance when the insurance is fairly priced.  To determine the sensitivity 
of the results to assumption 10, appendix A presents the model with 100 
percent of  bank liabilities covered by fixed-rate  deposit insurance,  where the 
deposit-insurance  premium is zero.  Finally, assumption 12 is made largely for 
convenience and ease of exposition.  The alternative would be 
to assume that 6 is binding for values of  where 4  >  (z-?)tc.  As shown in 
appendix B, results of the analysis are not materially affected by this 
assumption. 
Given the above assumptions, cash flows accruing to the bank's 
stockholders and depositors in each state at the end of the period are 
(Z -  ?)(I  -  tc) + 4  ZzQ+  6-4  l-t, 
(1)  P, -  (1 -  A)[(%  -  P)(1  -  t,)  + d]  d  P+-sZ<P+  6-d 
c  l-t, 
(1 -  A)(%  - ?)  ?sf<?+-  d 
c 





P,,  P,, - gross end-of-period  cash flows accruing to stockholders and 
depositors of the bank, respectively, 
9  - total end-of-period  promised payment to depositors, 
d  - total end-of-period  after-tax  value of nondebt tax shields if they 
are fully utilized, 
k  - cost of financial distress per dollar of end-of-period  firm value, 
6  - regulatory capital requirement at the end of the period, 
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d  - parameter indicating the proportionate response of the capital 
requirement to an increase in debt, 9. 
In equation 1, regulators impose a tax of X  on the end-of-period 
equity of the firm if z  is below ?+(6-d)/(l-t,) , that is, if equity is 
insufficient to meet the capital requirement  Z(1-t,)*-9  < 6.  As in 
BJK, nondebt tax shields exceed income taxes when z  is less than  ?*/t,. 
Equation 2 gives the end-of-period  pre-tax flows to the depositors. 
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the after-tax  values of the 
bank's  equity (S) and deposits (B) at the beginning of the period are 
where 
S  ,B  - the market value of the bank's  stock and deposits, 
respectively, 
E(F,),  E(Fb) - one plus the expected pre-tax  rate of return on 
stocks and deposits, respectively, 
ro  - one plus the rate of return on a risk-free  tax-exempt  bond, and 
f(z)  - probability density of Z. 
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Following  BJK,  the market value of  the banking firm is the sum  of 
equations 3 and  4, the market  value of  its equity and  deposits. 
The  first integral in equation 5 is the expected value  of  the bank  over 
the range of  Z where  the bank  fully utilizes its nondebt  tax shields.  The 
second integral is the expected value of  the regulatory tax wer the range of 
where  the bank  fully utilizes its nondebt  tax shields but fails to meet 
its capital guideline.  The  third integral is the expected value of  the bank 
over  the range of  where nondebt  tax shields are no  longer fully utilized. 
The  last integral is the expected value of  the bank  when  Z is not large 
enough  to meet promised payments  to depositors and  k percent  of  the firm value 
is lost to financial distress. 
The  optimal leverage decision involves choosing the end-of-period 
promised payment  to depositors, f,  to maximize  the value of  the bank.  The 
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where F(  -)  is the cumulative probability density function of z.  If A 
- 0, then the last term in equation 6,  A(.),  is zero and the resulting 
equation is identical to equation 6 in BJK.  The first two components of 
A(-)  make up the expected after-tax  regulatory penalty associated with 
issuing the last dollar of deposits.  The last component of A(.)  is the 
marginal increase in the cost of equity capital from issuing the last dollar 
of deposits, [6+d(6-d)/(l-tc) ]f  (?+(6-d)/[l-t,]) .  Because all of the components 
of A(-)  are positive, the optimal leverage for a bank facing a possible 
capital penalty is less than it would be for the same bank without a capital 
constraint  . 
The effects of fixed-rate  deposit insurance on a bank's  optimal 
leverage can  be seen  by relaxing assumption 11 and assuming that 100 percent 
of deposits are insured.  Subtracting equation 6 from V,  in the fully 
Y 
insured case gives us (1-  tpb)  [F(P) + k?f (2)  ] /ro  , which is positive.  Under 
fixed-rate  deposit insurance, the optimal 9  for insured banks is greater 
than for uninsured banks for two reasons.  First,  with deposit insurance, the 
probability that depositors will not be paid in full, ~(91,  is zero. 
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Second, because the costs of financial distress are borne by the FDIC, the 
leverage-related  costs, k?f (9) , do not factor into the bankf  s 
capital-structure  decision. 
IV. Comparative Statics 
Equation 6,  the first-order  necessary condition (FOC) for leverage, 
gives the optimal capital structure for a bank given d, 4,  A,  k, t,, 
tp, , t* , and u, where u is the standard deviation of g and we assume 
N  ~(it,o2). Differentiating the optimality condition (6) with respect 
to the above exogenous variables indicates how each affects optimal bank 
leverage. 
Equation 7 gives the impact of a change in the capital requirement on 
the optimality condition for leverage. 
Equation 7 is negative whenever x 1  ?+(6-4)/(1-t,).  That is, an increase 
in the capital requirement (through  an increase in d) reduces leverage when 
the bank, on average, expects to be able to meet capital requirements. 
However, if capital requirements are set at a level a bank does not expect to 
be able to meet, on average, then the bank may actually increase its leverage 
in response to an increase in d. 
The effect of an increase in nondebt tax shields, 4,  on the 
optimality condition (6) is 
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Equation 8 is positive when 2 r  ?+(6-4)/(1-t,).  This may seem to be 
counter-intuitive.  In the BJK model, an increase in 4  reduces leverage. 
However, there is ambiguity here because the capital requirement is based on 
the after-tax  value of equity, which includes the value of the shields, and 
the capital requirement is binding when the tax shields are being fully 
utilized.  For high-enough  values of z, an additional dollar of tax shields 
reduces the probability that the bank will violate the capital constraint and 
incur the regulatory penalty. 
Equation 9 shows that an increase in the regulatory penalty, A, 
reduces bank leverage.  Equation 10 demonstrates that an increase in the costs 
of financial distress, k, also reduces optimal leverage. 
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debt are shown in equations 11, 12, and 13.  In equation 11, the response of 
bank leverage to an increase in the marginal corporate tax rate is positive 
when  r ?+(6-4)/(1-t,) .  In other words, if expected end-of  -period 
income is large enough to meet capital requirements, then an increase in t, 
reduces the optimal level of debt.  The ambiguous sign for V-  when 
YtC 
%&+(6-#)/(I-t,)  arises because the capital constraint is assumed to 
be binding when the bank's  net tax bill is positive.  There are two separate 
effects.  First, an increase in tc  raises the value of the interest 
deduction on debt, which induces the bank to issue more deposits.  Second, 
there is a reduction in the after-tax  value of equity, which increases the 
probability that the capital constraint will be violated and also reduces 
leverage.  When the bank does not expect to meet its end-of-period  capital 
requirements, the sign of V-  depends on which effect dominates. 
YtC 
When X  equals zero (see BJK),  equation 12 is unambiguously negative at the 
optimal level of debt.  In addition,  when all of the bank's  deposits are 
insured, V.  is unambiguously negative.  However, for positive A 
Ytpb 
and no deposit insurance, equation 12 is negative for values of ? where the 
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costs.  As in BJK, V-  is unambiguously positive. 
Ytps 
Finally, the optimal level of deposits is a function of the variability 
of Z.  Equation 14 shows that an increase in a has an ambiguous effect 
on optimal leverage.  The sign of Vb  depends upon the proximity of 
?, ?+(6-4)/(1-t,) , and ?*/tc  to the mean of z, as well as on the magnitudes 
of k,  4,  d, and A. 
V. Municipal Securities and Optimal Leverage 
In the model presented above, the level of nondebt tax shields 
influences the optimal 2, since such shields substitute for the interest 
deduction allowable on bank debt.  Munis provide an alternative with which 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmbanks can reduce tax payments.  Gelfand and Hanweck (1987) use munis as 
proxies for nondebt tax shields, but this study views munis as substitutes for 
nondebt tax shields (such as investment tax credits and foreign tax credits) 
and allows for the simultaneous determination of muni holdings and leverage. 
Previous analyses of muni holdings support the view that banks adjust their 
muni portfolios to minimize tax liability given other nondebt tax shields (see 
Neubig and Sullivan [1987]).  In fact, the interest-expense ratio,  which is 
related to the level of debt, is a factor in determining muni holdings in such 
analyses. 
To see how the factors influencing optimal leverage would influence muni 
demand, suppose the return  were split between taxable returns (g) 
and tax-exempt  returns (Q).  Then, if the proportion going into munis, 
m - w,  were chosen so as to eliminate tax liability ( [q  -  ?] t,  - 4) , the 
share of munis would clearly be a function of nondebt tax shields, the 
corporate tax rate, total returns, and leverage: 
Unfortunately, the model we present assumes that portfolio composition is 
given.  However, Osterberg (1990) suggests that the determinants of muni 
demand include income/assets, the difference between the yield on munis 
relative to taxable investments and a break-even ratio, the interest-expense 
ratio, and loan-loss  provisions.  In the next section, we propose an empirical 
model of the choice of leverage (LEV) that differs from previous analyses by 
considering simultaneity  between LEV and muni holdings. 
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The general structure of our empirical model is given in equations 16 
and 17. 
(16) LEV - L(m, t,,  4,  loan-loss  provisions, o,  A)  + el 
(17)  m  - m(LEV,  t,,  4,  loan-loss  provisions, o, income, relative 
yield minus break-even  ratio) + em 
The actual capital requirement (d in our model) is excluded from the  .. 
empirical analysis because the primary capital-asset  ratio did not vary from 
0.055 during our sample period.  In each equation,  we distinguish between 4 
and loan-loss  provisions.  Loan-loss  provisions,  which did not appear in our 
theoretical  model, seem to be deductions from net income on financial 
statements.  However, loan-loss  provisions have been shown to be determinants 
of muni holdings and to sometimes signal asset quality.  The penalty for 
violating the capital guideline, A, is assumed to influence leverage but 
not muni demand.  Here, we are implicitly assuming that X - k, the cost of 
financial distress. 
Income, given the availability of various tax shields, influences muni 
demand, but only indirectly influences leverage.  The yield on munis relative 
to taxable investments minus a break-even  ratio influences muni demand.  The 
relative yield may also incorporate variations in personal tax rates, tPb and 
tp,,  which are not included directly.  Variance, o, is allowed to influence both 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmendogenous variables, and may impact muni demand by affecting uncertainty of 
income.  % and em are residuals.  The econometric specifications of the 
two equations are seen in equations 18 and 19. 
where X1 includes t,,  4, and loan-loss  provisions, and % includes 
t, , ,  loan-loss  provisions, income, and relative yield minus break-even 
ratio. 
In order to capture some of the nonlinear interactions predicted by our 
comparative statics results, both the standard deviation of return,  a, and 
the regulatory penalty, A,  enter interactively.  The standard deviation of 
return enters via the coefficients attached to X1 and %.  Each coefficient 
i in the vectors 0  and /3  is parameterized as 
-Ix  -mx 
where q is a vector of risk proxies.  Thus, risk influences the responses  - 
of LEV and m to other market determinants.  This allows us to distinguish 
between the influences of risk and a regulatory penalty, although the 
possibility that a regulatory subsidy influences LEV cannot be ruled out. 
The regulatory capital penalty influences the response of LEV to the 
market determinants in /3  t,,  4,  and loan-loss  provisions.  Thus, the 
-1X ' 
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effect, an effect that depends on the bank's  risk, and an effect that depends 
on regulation. 
VII. Data and Estimation 
We utilize balance-sheet information supplied by Kuester and O'Brien 
(1989) for 232 bank holding companies for December 1986,  June 1987, and 
December 1987.  Twenty-six  respondents from the sample were deleted because 
data were unavailable for items required to calculate some of our proxies. 
(Detailed information on our data manipulations is given in appendix C.)  This- 
section briefly describes the construction of our variables. 
LEV  is measured as the ratio between the book value of debt and the 
total of the market value of equity (see Kuester and O'Brien, p.14, for the 
construction of the market value of equity) and the book value of debt. m is 
calculated as the book value of munis divided by total assets.  The variable 
for loan-loss provisions is measured as the ratio between loan-loss  provisions 
and total assets, which we refer to as "llp."  tj is measured as the total 
of investment tax credits and foreign tax credits divided by total assets. 
t,  is the highest corporate income-tax  bracket in the state of 
incorporation.  The calculations of income and relative yield minus the 
break-even  ratio are described in more detail in appendix C.  We note that the 
relative yield employed is a national-average ratio rather than a 
state-specific  ratio.  The list of variables considered as proxies for (I  is 
given in appendix D.  Our q variables are all calculated as the difference 
between the particular balance-sheet ratio for holding company i at time j, 
and the mean ratio for all banks over the three periods. This allows us to 
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variables at the mean of the risk measures. 
Our proxy for A,  the regulatory penalty, is calculated as the 
difference between the holding company's  primary capital-asset  ratio and the 
average ratio for all holding companies at the same time.  This 
peer-group-standard  approach is similar to that of Marcus (1983).  In effect, 
the response of LEV to changes in t,,  4, and loan-loss  provisions is 
dependent on the holding company's  capital-asset  ratio relative to its peers. 
We utilize iterative three-stage least squares (3SLS) for all three 
reporting periods both separately and combined. Initially, all of the X's  and 
the products of the q's  with the X's  were considered as instruments. However, 
employing the collinearity diagnostics suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 
(1980), we found excessive collinearity. (Our procedure is described in 
appendix D.)  As a result, we exclude a subset of the products of q's  with the 
X's. 
VIII. Results 
Panels A and B of table I contain the 3SLS estimation results (using 
SHAZAM) for our model for each separate year and for the pooled sample.  Panel 
A contains the results from the leverage equation, and panel B contains the 
results from the muni equation.  A comparison  of our 3SLS results with those 
obtained using ordinary least-squares  (OLS) indicates significant simultaneity 
bias in the OLS results and lends support to our simultaneous equations 
approach. 
As expected, the coefficient on  m in panel A is negative and significant 
in all four regressions.  Since munis can substitute for interest expenses in 
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shielding income,  higher levels of munis will be associated with less 
leverage.  Similar reasoning explains the negative sign on LEV in the m 
equation for the entire sample.  However, it is somewhat puzzling that the 
coefficient on m for the December 1986 reporting period is smaller in absolute 
value than it is for the other periods, because TRA  reduced the demand for 
munis after 1986.  It is possible that portfolio rebalancing by banks in 
reaction to TRA  introduced noise into the relationship between m and LEV in 
the December 1986 regressions, thereby reducing the measured relationship 
between them.  The positive and insignificant coefficient on LEV in panel B 
for December 1986 is consistent with this explanation. 
In the leverage equation, the coefficient on t,  is negative and 
significant for all of the regressions.  The average effect of a higher 
corporate income-tax  rate is a reduction in leverage.  In  our model, the sign 
of the relationship is ambiguous because,  while a higher tax rate increases 
the value of the interest deduction, it also decreases the value of equity and 
thus increases the probability of violating the guidelines.  The interactive 
term involving the regulatory penalty and t,  should have captured the latter 
effect.  Our result on the average effect of t,  differs from that of Marcus 
(1983), who found that the expected sign on his measure of the tax incentive 
increased leverage.  However, we divide the influence of t,  into three 
separate channels. 
The coefficient on 4  is negative and significant in the pooled 
regression and supports the DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) hypothesis that 
nondebt tax shields are a substitute for interest tax shields.  However, the 
coefficient on 4  is insignificant, with a sign that differs between 
subperiods.  Our theory implies that an increase in 4  may not always reduce 
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course, in our estimation, 4  is allowed to influence m directly and via its 
interaction with risk, and then to influence LEV through three separate 
channels. 
The interactive effect of t,  and regulation on LEV is only significant 
for the first subperiod.  We note that, for nonregulated firms, 
BJK  found a positive and significant relationship between nondebt tax shields 
and leverage. 
Finally, the positive sign on the coefficient of loan-loss  provisions is 
consistent with banks'  use of these provisions to signal the true quality of 
their asset portfolio and the income-smoothing  hypothesis (see Greenwalt and 
Sinkey [1988]); it is inconsistent with the view of  provisions as alternative 
shields.  Since 1987, net charge-offs  have been the more appropriate measure 
of bad-debt deductions.  Prior to that time, the deduction included an 
addition to the bad-debt  reserve.  However, the negative and significant sign 
on  provisions in the muni equation for the entire sample and for December 1986 
may capture any role of provisions as a proxy for the bad-debt  deduction. 
Risk directly affects leverage interactively with t,,  4,  and 
loan-loss  provisions. Risk also influences LEV indirectly through m, since the 
second equation contains interactive risk measures.  While some of the 
coefficients on the interactive risk measures for both the leverage and muni 
equations are significant,  we have no interest in the individual interactions. 
Table I1 indicates that we reject the restriction that the interactive risk 
measures are jointly zero at the 1 percent significance level.  In  other 
words, the response of leverage to a change in m, t,,  4,  or loan-loss 
provisions is a function of the risk of the institution. 
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the entire sample.  Only the interaction  of bank capital standards with 4 
is insignificant for any of the subperiods.  Table I1 indicates that we reject 
the restriction that the coefficients on the regulatory penalty measures are 
jointly zero at the 1 percent significance level in all sample periods.  In 
other words, the response of leverage to changes in tax provisions or to other 
market determinants depends on the bank's  capital position relative to its 
peers.  The magnitude of the coefficients on the interactive terms relative to 
the direct effects suggests that the response of leverage to a change in t,, 
4,  or loan-loss  provisions is larger (smaller) for banks with high (low) 
capital relative to their peers. 
In the muni equation, the positive signs for income and yield are as 
expected.  Higher income requires more munis as shields.  Purchases of munis 
after 1986 reduced tax benefits, but nonetheless, banks increased their muni 
holdings that year, apparently in anticipation of a need to shelter income. 
Although only significant in December 1986, higher nondebt tax shields or 
provisions reduce muni demand.  The results for June 1987 and December 1987 
indicate that banks located in states with high corporate tax rates have lower 
muni holdings.  This is somewhat surprising,  since these banks would be 
expected to have a greater demand for all types of shields.  We note, however, 
that our yield minus break-even ratio does not incorporate state-specific 
information. 
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Using a modified version of the BJK optimal-capital-structure  model, we 
show how regulatory and market influences may interact in the determination of 
bank leverage.  The influence of capital regulation on leverage may be 
nonlinear, depending on market determinants such as tax rates, tax shields, 
and variance of returns. 
The theoretical analysis yields some surprising conclusions.  First, 
increased capital requirements may not reduce leverage, and banks not 
expecting to meet the guidelines may respond perversely.  Second,  higher 
levels of nondebt tax shields may not reduce a bank's  leverage if such shields 
can help to meet the guidelines.  Third, a change in the corporate tax rate 
may have an unexpected influence on leverage through altering the probability 
that a bank will meet capital guidelines. 
Empirically, we allow for nonlinearity by modeling the influence of 
market determinants on leverage as operating directly, indirectly with risk, 
and indirectly with regulation.  Our results demonstrate that it is important 
to control for the endogeneity of the muni holdings of banks.  To do this, we 
set up a two-equation  system and use 3SLS.  This differs from the approach of 
Gelfand and Hanweck (1987), who use munis as proxies for tax shields.  Our 
results show that both book capital regulation and portfolio risk influence 
the market leverage of banks.  We cannot claim to have addressed Keeleyfs 
(1988b) concern and controlled for the influence of risk on a regulatory 
subsidy.  However, contrary to the results of  Wall and Peterson (1988b), our 
results provide important support for considering market influences on bank 
leverage.  Tax rates, nondebt tax shields, and loan-loss  provisions impact the 
leverage decisions of banks. 
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Iterative 3SLS  Estimation of  LEV,  m  System 
sample  a1  1  Dec.  1986  June 1987  Dec.  1987 
variables 
Panel A:  Dependent Variable-LEV 
intercept  0.983  0.948  0.961  0.975 
( .066)*  ( .006)*  ( .008)*  ( .007)* 
interactive risk measures: 
q5*tc  2.348 
(0.724)* 
q5*llp  -1.559 
(9.758) 
q6*llp  -14.593 
(8.181)* 
q7*tc  -11.435 
(3.442)* 
q9*d  749.78 
(961.2) 
qll*tc  -0.344 
(0.115)* 
qll*d  13.001 
(49.58) 
q14*tc  -0.002 
( .052) 
q14*d  39.602 
(15.99) 
q14*llp  0.501 
(0.470) 
q15*tc  0.105 
( .083) 
q20*tc  0.038 
( .231) 
@O*d  55.069 
(85.01) 
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interactive regulatory penalty measures: 
qr*t,  -8.058  -10.407  - 5.204  -7.524 
( .868)*  (1.253)*  (1.596)*  (1.601)* 
q-d  -85.578  1375.3  24.201  -2286.7 
(347.4)  (731.6)*  (874.5)  (1727.5) 
qr*ll~  19.43  11.669  31.509  26.911 
(3.94)*  (6.727)*  (9.184)*  (9.959)* 
Total 
observations  696  232  232 
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Iterative 3SLS Estimation of LEV, m System 
sample  all  Dec. 1986  June 1987  Dec. 1987 
variables 
Panel B:  Dependent Variable-m 
intercept  0.215  -0.406  0.380  0.249 
( .079)*  (  .161)*  ( .139)*  (  .152) 
LEV  -0.183 
( .084)* 
c  -0.082 
(  .045) 
4  -8.835 
(5.714) 
11~  -0.407 
(  .218)* 
income  1.332 
( .275)* 
yield  0.109 
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*  Significant at the 10 percent confidence level.  * Significant at the 5 percent confidence level. 
NOTE:  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. 
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Hypothesis Tests of the Impact of Capital Standards and Risk 
Hypothesis C1: There is no channel through which regulatory capital standards 
influence leverage, that is, all of the coefficients on the 
regulatory capital measure equal zero. 
Hypothesis R1: There is no channel through which risk influences leverage, 
that is, all of the coefficients on the risk measures equal 
zero. 
sample  all 
Cl.: 
F-statistic  30.588- 
(d.f.)  (3,1332) 
Wald Chi-Squared  91.762- 
(d.0  (3) 
Wald Chi-Squared  83.966- 
(d.f.)  (31) 
Dec. 1986  June 1987  Dec. 1987 
**  Significant at the 1 percent level. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations. 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmAppendix A 
With 100% Fixed-Rate, Zero-Premium Deposit Insurance 
Given assumptions 1 through 10 and 12, and that 100 percent of bank 
liabilities are insured with a flat-rate insurance premium of zero, cash 
returns to the stockholders and depositors in each state at the end of the 
period are given by equations la and 2a. 
(la)  T,-  Z-P 
where 
T,,  Tb - gross end-of-period  cash flows to stockholders and 
depositors, respectively, 
9  - total end-of-period  promised payment to depositors, 
4  - total end-of-period  after-tax  value of nondebt tax shields if they 
are fully utilized, 
6  - regulatory capital requirement at the end of the period, and 
4  - regulatory penalty per dollar of end-of-period  equity. 
The beginning-of  -period  values of equity (S) and deposits (B) are 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmThe total value of the bank is V - S + B. 
Comparative Statics 
The optimal amount of bank debt, ?,  is implied by the first-order 
condition,  V- - 0. 
Y 
Equations 7a to 14a indicate how the optimal leverage implied by equation 6a 
responds to d, 4, A,  k, t,,  tps,  tpb,  and o [where  o is the standard 
deviation of f  (z) and we assume Z  .u  ~(g,d)],  respectively. 
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Comparative Statics When 4/tc > 6 
With the additional assumption that the capital constraint is binding in those 
states of the world where the bank pays no taxes, the returns to bank 
stockholders and depositors are indicated in equations lb and 2b, 
respectively. 
(lb)  Tn  -  Z  - ?  ?+a  sZ<?+-  4 
c 
(1 -  A)(Z  - ?)  ?sZ<?+6 
0  Z<? 
?  ?lZ 
(2b)  T  i(1-k)  0<Z<? 
0  otherwise, 
where 
T,,  ?b  - gross end-of  -period cash flows to bank's  stockholders and 
depositors, respectively, 
?  - total end-of-period  promised payment to depositors, 
4  - total end-of-period  after-tax  value of nondebt tax shields when 
fully utilized, 
k  - cost of financial distress per dollar of the end-of-period  debt 
value, 
6  - regulatory capital requirement at the end of the period, and 
4  - regulatory penalty (or tax) per dollar of end-of-period  equity. 
The beginning-of-period  values of stock, deposits, and total bank value are 
given by equations 3b, 4b,  and 5b. 
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Optimal leverage for the bank is given by equation 6b. 
Equations 7b to 14b indicate how the optimal leverage responds to changes in 
d, 4, A, k, tc,  tpm,  t*,  and o, respectively. 
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Ytc 
(l-(F(?&))  + Lf(?&)]  > 0 
c  tc  tc 
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Data Manipulations and Variable Definitions 
Data manipulations 
Most of the data were generously supplied to us by Kathleen Kuester and 
James OIBrien.  Except for market values of equity, the original data were 
reported on Y-9  reports, the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank 
Holding Companies.  Market values of equity included common stock,  preferred 
stock, certificates,  rights, and warrants.  Prices used were end-of-month 
data.  See Kuester and OIBrien  (1989,  p.14)  for more detail regarding these 
calculations.  State-specific  marginal corporate income-tax  rates were taken 
from Significant Facts About Fiscal Federalism (Advisory Council on 
Intergovernmental  Relations, 1987 and 1988). 
We use quarterly balance-sheet (Y-9)  data for three periods: December 
1986, June 1987, and December 1987.  Stock measures are values at the end of 
each six months.  Income-statement  items are year-to-date. We divide the 
December 1986 income numbers in half and replace December 1987 flows by the 
difference between December and June. 
Our final sample includes 232 bank holding companies for the three 
periods.  Suspicious data items for which bank holding companies were removed 
from the sample include: negative values for investment tax credits, foreign 
tax credits, tax-exempt lease income, and negative values for loan-loss 
provisions. In  our calculation  of q15 (which should be less than 1.0),  we 
replace  values exceeding 1.0 with their inverse.  In  addition, if the 
denominator of q14 or q15 is zero, we set each ratio equal to zero. 
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LEV  -  total liabilities/total liabilities + market value of equity 
m  -  securities issued by state and political subdivisions/total assets 
tc  -  marginal corporate tax rate (from Significant Facts About Fiscal 
Federalism 
4  -  estimated investment tax credit + estimated foreign tax credit/ 
total assets 
llp  -  loan-loss  provisions/total assets 
u  -  financial ratios listed in appendix D 
X  -  the difference between bank i's  capital-asset ratio at time j and 
the average ratio for all banks at time j,  where the ratio is 
calculated as equity capital + minority interest in consolidated 
subsidiaries + mandatory convertible securities + allowance for loan 
and lease losses/total assets 
yield - relative yield minus break-even  ratio, where 
relative yield - the ratio between the yields on 10-year  munis and 
10-year  Treasuries, and 
break-even ratio - 1 -  t*[l-b*(id/yield  on  Treasuries)], where 
t  - federal marginal corporate tax rate 
b  - interest expense disallowance ratio 
id  - interest expense/total assets 
income - MAX(O,gti)/total  assets, where 
gti  - income before extraordinary items + income taxes -  gains on 
securities  not in trading accounts + loan-loss  provisions + interest 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmexpense disallowed as a deduction (bid, described below) + net 
charge-offs  + recapture of loan-loss  reserves (recapllr,  described 
below) + grossed-up tax-exempt  income (gtei, described below) 
bid  - (b * interest expense * munis * tax-exempt  income 
[described  below])/income  on munis * total assets 
tax-exempt  income - income on munis + income on tax-exempt leases + income on 
tax-  exempt loans 
gtei  - (tax-exempt  income) * (l/relative yield -  1) 
recapllr - recapture of loan-loss  reserves required of some banks by the TRA. 
For any banks with December 1986 total assets of less than $500 
million or with a problem loan ratio in excess of 0.75, this number 
equals zero. 
problem loan ratio - total nonaccrual loans and lease financing receivables + 
loans 90 days past due but still accruing + restructured loans/ 
equity capital,  where both numerator and denominator are the sum of 
the December 1986 and December 1987 items so that this is the 
average ratio for 1987 
Banks not meeting either exception must include (recapture) into 1987 income 
at least 10  percent of December 1986 loan-loss  reserves.  Banks may recapture 
more than 10 percent in 1987.  We assume that banks will recapture more than 
10  percent if such a recapture still leaves them with negative income, that 
is, if December 1987 net income + 0.10 * December 1986 loan loss reserves < 0 
recapture will equal min(-net  income, loan-loss  reserve),  since banks cannot 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmrecapture more  than  the  available reserve.  We  assume  that  any  recapture  is 
split equally between  the  two  halves of  1987. 
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How We Chose Our Proxies for Risk 
In our framework, o (the standard deviation of z)  influences 9 via its 
interaction  with the other independent variables.  Thus, our risk proxies 
appear in multiplicative form.  We follow Kuester and OtBrien  (1989) and 
parameterize the coefficient on each independent variable as pi -  ai  + &is, 
where pi is the response of the dependent variable to independent 
variable i, and q is the vector of risk proxies, all of which are  - 
mean-deleted.  As  indicated  by Kuester and OtBrien,  this setup implies that 
the ai  coefficient can be interpreted as the response of the dependent 
variable at the mean of the risk  measures.  This parameterization also implies 
that each independent variable appears only on the right side and is 
multiplied by each risk proxy. 
We consider 21 proxies for risk, testing for potentially damaging 
collinearity.  First, we apply our diagnostic procedure to the matrix of qts 
and delete several q's  from the subsequent analysis.  Note that choosing a 
principal component would complicate the interpretation of the coefficients. 
However, with only the non-o independent variables in the estimating 
equations, we find there is still too much collinearity among the instruments, 
which include (1) the intercept, (2) each independent  variable appearing in 
equations 16 and 17, and (3) the product of the remaining q's  and the 
independent variables.  Applying the same diagnostics to that instrument 
matrix leaves us with the variables in table I. 
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ql)  proportion of securities held as U.S. Treasuries 
q2)  proportion of real estate loans to total loans 
q3)  proportion of loans to domestic commercial and industrial customers 
q4)  proportion of loans to all types of commercial and industrial 
customers 
q5)  proportion of loans to agricultural customers 
q6)  proportion of loans to foreign governments and official 
institutions 
q7)  proportion of loans that are at least 90  days past due and still 
accruing 
q8)  proportion of loans that are nonaccrual 
q9)  proportion between net charge-offs  and total loans 
q10) proportion between loan-loss  provisions and total loans 
qll) proportion of securities with a remaining maturity of one year or 
less 
q12) proportion of total assets that reprice or mature within one year 
q13) proportion between interest-bearing  deposit liabilities that reprice 
or mature within one year and total interest-bearing  deposits 
q14) proportion of long-term debt that is repriced within one year 
q15) proportion of long-term debt that matures within one year 
q20) ratio between noninterest income and the total of interest income 
and noninterest income 
www.clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmq21) - loan-to-total-asset  ratio 
q22) - proportion of total assets that are liquid 
q23) - ratio between volatile liabilities and total assets 
q24) - proportion of total assets that are current 
q25) - ratio between current liabilities and total assets 
The first fifteen  variables are similar to those analyzed by Kuester and 
O'Brien,  while the last six are additional proxies for interest-rate  risk. 
The diagnostic procedure we employ is suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and 
Welsch (BKW, [1980]).  The matrix analyzed includes an intercept and the 
difference between each q and its mean.  As suggested by BKW, all variables 
are scaled so that they have length equal to one.  Although BKW suggest that 
the variates be analyzed in level form, in our estimation procedure, the q's 
do not enter in level form; in fact, they only enter after having been 
multiplied by other variables. 
In  the first step, we examine the condition indexes:  Any index over 30 
is associated with a too-harmful  linear dependency.  In  the second step, we 
examine the matrix of variance decomposition proportions and identify the 
variables most closely involved in those dependencies.  There are 74  indexes 
over 30.  We then calculate the proportions of the variances of each 
coefficient that are explained by these 74  dependencies and eliminate the 74 
variables involving q's  that are most closely associated with these 
dependencies. 
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